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Policies,	Politics	and	Demand	Side	Innovations:	the	Untold	Story	of	
Germany’s	Energy	Transition		
 
By C. Kuzemko; C. Mitchell; M. Lockwood; R. Hoggett 
 
 
1.	 Introduction	
Many governments around the world have made specific commitments to sustainable energy 
transitions, often on the understanding that energy market decarbonisation is an essential 
element in meeting climate mitigation objectives. These new commitments have already 
resulted in a significant rise in governance strategies and policies designed ultimately to 
change how energy is produced and used. Many such policies have, however, been focused 
on the decarbonisation of energy supply whilst commitment to demand focused solutions has, 
arguably since the 1980s, taken a relative back seat (Warren 2014; Sorrell 2015). Certainly 
one of the greatest areas of change in how we produce and use energy thus far has been the 
marked development and deployment of renewable generation technologies. This is not to say 
that there has been no progress in demand side governance and innovations, but just to 
suggest that we remain some way off the kind of fundamental shift in the underlying design 
of energy systems, from the supply to the demand side, that some argue is required (ECC 
2010; Warren 2014; DECC 2014; Rosenow et al 2016).  
 A fundamental shift to demand-focused markets is, of course, easier described than 
achieved in practice. This might not be too surprising if we consider that some demand 
innovations are relatively new, such as those associated with demand side response. At the 
same time demand innovations understood in the broadest sense, to explicitly include demand 
reduction, demand side response and distributed energy, have not been a high priority for 
energy policymakers. What this means, however, in academic and practical terms, is that 
much needs still to be learnt about demand governance. This paper is one contribution 
towards an improved understanding of demand governance, how it is developing in practice 
and how it inter-relates with market innovations. 
 As set out in Section 2, this task is approached through the lenses of recent scholarship 
on the politics and policy of energy system transitions, that sees governing for fundamental 
change as a highly political but also contingent process (Kern 2011; Andrews-Speed 2016; 
Fouquet 2016; Schmid et al 2016). There are three basic conceptual assumptions made. 
Firstly, that governance choices are important to the nature of any given sustainable energy 
transition, because they both enable and constrain technological, corporate and social 
innovations (Kuzemko et al 2016). Secondly, that demand governance does not take place 
within a vacuum and, as such, choices are contingent upon a range of other energy and 
political contexts (Andrews-Speed 2016; Lockwood et al 2016). Lastly, that profound, 
system-wide transitions involving multiple economic sectors and societal groups tend to take 
some time to complete (Fouquet 2016; Schmid et al 2016). Taken together what these 
assumptions amount to is an understanding that the politics of energy policymaking is 
unlikely to remain static given that systems, power relations and markets alter and change 
over time. In order, therefore, to understand how demand governance is developing in any 
given country analysis needs to not only encompass the broad range of demand strategies and 
policies in place, but also be sensitive to the precise ways in which political and market 
contexts may be changing over time.  
 This paper, in Section 3, focuses the analytical lens onto demand governance in one 
case study country, Germany, but across the three inter-related areas of demand innovations 
outlined above. The intention here is to analyse policies and strategies, how energy markets 
are changing as well as some of the implications of these changes for recent German energy 
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governance decisions and, indeed, for the nature of its transition. The analysis focuses on one 
country because of the level of detail that this will allow when building an understanding of 
demand governance, but also given assumptions here about the contingent nature of policy 
decision-making. Arguably, Germany makes for an interesting case study, partly because it is 
often held up as a leader in terms of sustainable energy governance (Mitchell et al 2006; Pahle 
& Steinbacher 2015; Schroeter et al 2016), and it will be interesting to see if, when refocusing 
the analytical lens onto demand governance, it still appears innovative. Secondly, Germany’s 
energy markets have already changed quite substantially, indeed it is understood by some to 
already be in ‘phase 2’ of its sustainable energy transition (Kitzing & Mitchell 2015; 
Interview 9).i This means that Germany is further down the road than some countries, and that 
new policies and market changes have already had some clearly identifiable implications for 
how the politics of governing for demand innovations have progressed. 
 
 
2.	 Theorising	Demand	Governance	and	Energy	System	Transition	
Many demand strategies and policies date back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when 
demand reduction was pursued by a number of countries in the aftermath of the oil shocks 
(Warren 2014; Sorrell 2015). Such policies were taken up on the basis of assumptions that 
reducing demand would result in lower dependence on energy imports, thereby contributing 
to the important energy governance objective of supply security. Times have, however, 
changed and although supply security remains important, energy policymakers are now 
devising policies that must respond to a broader and more complex range of objectives. At the 
same time energy markets are also changing quite rapidly.  
 Although many claim that demand innovations are central to delivering on the 
trilemma of energy objectives, relatively less is known about how to govern over time to best 
engender a broad array of demand innovations. Recent theorisations of governing for energy 
transitions have tended not to factor in the demand side in any great detail (Araújo 2014; 
Schaffer & Brun 2015; Andrews-Speed 2016; Schmid et al 2016; Kuzemko et al 2016). 
Energy demand focused analyses, on the other hand, have often been concerned with single 
categories, for example demand side response (Torriti et al 2014; Bayer 2015; Fell et al 
2015), or demand reduction (Rosenow 2013; Mallaburn & Eyre 2014; Reid et al 2015; Sorrell 
2015). These literatures arguably, therefore, tell us too little about complex processes of 
governing for multiple, but in some cases only emerging, demand innovations.  
 
2.1  Extending Definitions of Demand Innovations 
In this sub-section demand governance is broadly defined in order to take better account of 
the complexity and challenges faced in this fast emerging policy area. The need to understand 
this area better is based on arguments that a lasting move away from fossil fuel usage will be 
easier, less costly and less politically difficult if demand innovations are placed at the core of 
how markets operate (ECC 2010: 14-16). Inspiration is taken from recent non-academic 
research that has intentionally broadened out what is meant by demand innovations and their 
role within sustainable transitions (DECC 2014; Hinton & Thumim 2014; Rosenow et al 
2016). In these reports demand side innovations are brought together under three, related 
categories: distributed energy, demand reduction and demand side response (DSR), 
sometimes referred to together as ‘D3’ (DECC 2014: 4; Hinton & Thumim 2014: 3).   
 From this literature we can see that each category has multiple roles to play within 
sustainable, secure and affordable energy systems. For example the long-term reduction of 
demand, including peak demand, is seen as especially relevant to the extent that this results in 
less expensive new generation and lower consumer costs (Warren 2014). Demand reduction 
and energy efficiency, together with active demand side response, can also ensure the most 
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efficient use of decarbonised generation capacity thereby also bringing down the overall costs 
of energy systems. Hence claims that reducing energy demand is the most promising, fastest, 
cheapest and safest means to mitigate climate change (Sorrell 2015: 74). 
 Distributed energy is defined as the production of heat or electrical power near the end 
of the distribution network, and other practices that can balance loads at a similarly local scale 
(Hinton & Thumin 2014: 3; DECC 2014: 4). It is argued that, wherever possible, using 
energy closer to where it is generated reduces the distance that electricity and heat need to 
travel across networks – thereby reducing system costs. Although distributed generation is a 
fast growing phenomenon in electricity markets in particular, as renewable technologies 
develop and are more widely diffused, this is by no means always matched by greater local 
consumption. Thinking about how to operationalise distributed energy brings to the fore 
difficult questions of how to localise practices that tend to have become centralised over time, 
such as markets, pricing and data availability (Goulden et al 2014). Another, less technical, 
claim about distributed energy it is more actively inclusive of consumers, who importantly are 
also citizens and voters. For example, German and Danish transitions have tended to include 
more community, household and municipal actor groups within renewable generation 
processes (Fuchs & Hinderer 2016; Schmid et al 2016). In this way some citizen groups 
become part of and invested in sustainable transitions, instead of a sustainable transition being 
something that is done to them.  
 Demand side response, including supporting consumers to undertake short-term 
shifting of load, also has a wide range of potential benefits. It can be used to lower peak 
demand, avoid investment in costly generation capacity, better enable local markets, and 
contribute to maintaining dynamic system stability (DECC 2014: 4; Koliou et al 2014: 245). 
Intelligent, ICT-based control of local networks can also make an important contribution, in 
particular in terms of balancing the increased quantities of distributed renewable generation 
being connected to distribution networks (Goulden et al 2014; Lockwood 2015). In the past 
market actors involved in demand response have tended to be large industrial companies, but 
there is now a growing political and market focus on the value that including medium and 
small sized consumers in demand response can offer and, hence, on demand aggregation 
(Torriti et al 2010). 
 Taken as a whole, therefore, embedding demand innovations from across each 
category can provide multiple social and technical functions within processes of sustainable 
energy system change. Indeed, some governance bodies have started to place particular 
emphasis on the need to not only govern simultaneously for the full range of innovations, but 
to also integrate policies across categories in order to achieve more demand-focused outcomes 
(DECC 2014: 5; IEA 2016). 
 
2.2 Governance, Markets and Change 
As mentioned in the introduction, governance is widely understood to be of central 
importance to how demand innovations emerge and become diffused, but arguably in a range 
of different ways. Economic historians and socio-technical transitions scholars have argued 
that governance can be important to enabling sustainable innovations (Markard et al 2012; 
Fouquet 2016). This can be achieved via different governance methods, for example by 
implementing sustainability objectives that set direction for market and political actors and/or 
devising policies and regulations that support niche technological innovations. Governance 
can, however, also constrain and delimit what kinds of changes are possible, for example if 
regulations act as barriers to entry to certain niche technologies.  
 Underpinning demand governance is an assumption that governance and markets 
dynamically inter-relate over time, or as some scholars put it, that there are both positive and 
negative feedback mechanisms between policies and markets (Lockwood et al 2016). 
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Feedback effects can arise from a range of different actor groups, including incumbent and 
new, more innovative energy actor groups (ibid: 11). At the same time, it is worth noting that 
although sustainable energy governance has emerged quite strongly over the past decade or so 
specific strategies, policies and regulations will themselves be open to contestation and 
change over time. The possibility of challenge and change to sustainable governance is 
important to bear in mind given that large-scale socio-technical transitions tend to take place 
across decades (Kitzing & Mitchell 2015; Fouquet 2016).  
 This means that there will be multiple points in time at which sustainable energy 
policies can be contested by new ideas about how to produce and use energy, and to what end. 
At each point policy decision-making can be informed by political factors, such as the nature 
of government in power at the time, but also by new debates about and reactions to energy 
policies (Hake et al 2015; Lauber & Jacobsson 2016). What is suggested here is that these 
debates will be informed in part by the experiences of those societal actor groups affected by 
how markets are changing (Lockwood 2014), including energy companies (Geels 2014). As 
such, the precise ways in which different sets of actor groups have been experiencing energy 
system change becomes highly relevant. For example, some companies who lose out as a 
result of transition have tended to put forward arguments to try to slow it down or to cast 
doubt upon sustainable energy narratives (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006; Geels 2014). At the 
same time, those whose interests are in the provision of sustainable, innovative products and 
services have argued for governance changes that, for example, place greater value on 
demand.  
How different citizen groups, understood as voters, experience energy system change 
also has a bearing on the terms of political debate and on possible policy choices (Stefes 
2010; Jacobs et al 2014; Schmid et al 2016). Citizens can experience transition via their role 
as consumers, for example when faced with higher energy prices, but also through changing 
employment opportunities, in the instance that new jobs become available in energy services 
and existing positions in fossil fuel companies disappear. However, as mentioned above, 
demand innovations can also offer some citizens a new set of opportunities to become active, 
or passive, participants in energy markets. Recent research shows that active citizen 
participation in all stages of development can improve the public acceptance of renewables, 
allowing for a more positive politics of distributed energy (Schmid et al 2016: 267). It is 
partly for these reasons that Stefes has argued that governance that successfully creates new 
markets, employment and other opportunities will tend to have self-reinforcing dynamics 
(2010).  
What this conceptual approach suggests is not only that governance, market outcomes, 
how actor groups experience change and politics are inter-linked, and indeed co-constituted, 
but also that how they interact can be historically and contextually contingent (Lockwood et al 
2016). These lenses have informed the methodological approach taken here, in particular the 
choice of studying one, single case study, as this is arguably more suited to eliciting more 
detailed, and contextually relevant information (Yin 2014: 13; Hennik et al 2011:10-11 and 
17). This choice is also more suited to the objectives of this analysis, to extend understandings 
of the fast evolving but temporally contingent policy area of demand governance. In this way 
methodological decisions have been guided by the conceptual lenses applied and by the 
explanatory objectives of the research. 
The analysis below is mixed methods as it draws on three principle sets of data: in-
depth interviews, Federal energy policy and strategy documents, and recent expert and 
consultancy reports and surveys. In total 27 interviews were conducted during two research 
trips to Germany in 2014 and 2015, as well as over email and telephone.ii Federal government 
staff, government consultants and advisory groups, all policy experts in demand management, 
were interviewed in order to elicit information about: demand policies, how markets are 
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changing, newly emerging policy debates, and how these changes have been influencing 
governance choices. In order to gain further insights into how markets are changing, and how 
corporate groups are experiencing and responding to these changes, representatives from 
incumbent and challenger utilities were also interviewed.  
All interviews took the form of extended face-to-face conversations and were loosely 
structured around a set of questions about demand policies, politics and how markets were 
changing. This less formal approach allowed for interviewees to offer their expertise 
unrestricted by too much pre-supposition on behalf of the interviewer. In addition, given the 
broad, complex and fast evolving nature of this policy area, this approach had the added 
advantage of allowing for the recording of information that may not have been anticipated. 
Analysis of Federal government energy strategy and policy documents took place both before 
the interviews, so that it was possible to enter into some detail during interviews, and after, as 
new policies emerged and to cross check information gleaned from interviews. Where 
necessary, particularly as policies changed, further clarification was sought from interviewees 
over email or telephone conversations and from consultancy and other expert sources. 
 
 
3.	 Demand	Governance	in	Germany		
There is a considerable literature on German supply side sustainable energy governance, 
including studies that have sought to explain the socio-political contexts within which the 
Energiewende emerged (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006; Toke & Lauber 2007; Hake et al 2015; 
Lauber & Jacobsson 2016). We can glean much from these analyses about the quite unique 
contextual factors that helped to support and inform radical governance and market changes: 
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster; the Red-Green coalition government; the relative 
predominance of social market economy and re-municipalisation ideas; and the ability and 
willingness of Parliament to stand up to coalitions against sustainable energy change. What 
we also learn is that Germany is understood as having led the way in renewable policy, 
renewable energy growth, technological learning and innovation, and in unleashing new 
market entrants (Mitchell et al 2006; Schüppe 2014; Geels et al 2016; Schmid et al 2016; 
Lauber and Jacobsson 2016).  
 In this section the analytical lens is refocused onto the less researched demand side of 
Federal energy governance and markets. Each sub-section, on demand reduction, distributed 
energy and demand side response, sets out the most relevant policies and strategies, how 
markets are changing over time, and how related challenges emerge and influence new policy 
debates and decisions. What this section shows, in part, is that debates around consumer costs 
and decentralised energy systems have become pivotal to how energy policy debates are re-
emerging. It also shows that there are multiple governance changes underway in response to 
what is being learnt about energy transitions and about demand innovations. All of this is 
important to altering the manner in which one of the highest profile sustainable energy 
transitions proceeds, and the role of demand innovations within it. 
 
3.1 Demand Reduction: Governance and New Markets 
What is particularly significant about German demand reduction governance is that it is 
rooted in comprehensive and aggressive medium and long-term demand targets, some of 
which are more ambitious, and longer term, than those set by the EU Energy Efficiency 
Directive. Specifically, Energiewende objectives are to reduce primary energy consumption 
by 20% by 2020 and 50% by 2050 - both compared to 2008 levels; and to reduce electricity 
consumption by 10% by 2020 and 25% by 2050 (BMUB 2013; Agora 2016). There are also 
policy sub-goals – for example of renovating existing building stock at a rate of 2% per 
annum and of an 80% reduction in primary energy consumption in the buildings sector by 
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2050 (BMUB 2013; Interviews 3 and 19). Indeed, the biggest share of potential CO2 
emissions reductions, 25-30 million tonnes, specified in Germany’s Climate Action Plan 2014 
is estimated to come from energy efficiency measures (Appunn 2014b). 
 In terms of policies and regulations in place, buildings efficiency policies have been 
extensively outlined elsewhere and so the intention here is not to re-describe them in detail 
(Schlomann & Eichhammer 2012; Rosenow 2013). What we can learn from this research, and 
was confirmed during interviews, is that the role of considerable KfW Banking Group grant 
and subsidised loan programmes has been a central tenet of buildings efficiency policy. One 
effect of this has been to make refurbishment loans more accessible and affordable and, see 
below, to facilitate greater investment (Rosenow 2013; Interviews 3, 17 and 19). Equally 
important to how buildings efficiency markets have developed has been the application of 
strict buildings standards, such as the Energy Conservation Ordinance (EnEV) (GBPN 2016). 
Regulatory standards have also been applied as incentives. One example is high efficiency 
mortgages whereby, if a building meets certain standards such as ‘Passiv Haus’, then the 
borrower can benefit from reduced interest rates on their loan (Interview 17). 
What is also clear is that German energy demand has been falling. Indeed, according 
to the German Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen (AGEB), which monitors the 
Energiewende, primary energy consumption fell 9% between 2008 and 2014, whilst levels 
recorded in 2014 were the lowest since reunification in 1990 (BMWi 2014b: 9). Demand for 
electricity has also been on a downward trend since 2007, falling by 4% between 2013 and 
2014, while the economy grew by 1.4% (ibid). This, as well as recent figures on energy 
intensity, has led some to argue that Germany has managed to delink economic growth from 
energy demand growth (IEA 2014; Agora 2015d), and Germany also consistently tops 
international benchmarks on energy efficiency (Kallakuri et al 2016). 
A far less widely discussed aspect of German energy efficiency governance is the 
degree to which efficiency policy is perceived as a way of creating new economic 
opportunities (BMWi 2014a and 2014c). Policies aimed at promoting the manufacture of 
‘green’ goods, such as energy efficiency technologies, and at training and re-skilling energy 
efficiency workforces are explicitly part of a wider green industrial policy (BMWi 2014a: 2). 
This in practice marks a departure from the emphasis often placed on energy efficiency as 
offering opportunities to lower costs, for example in claims that energy efficiency measures 
save $5.7 trillion in energy expenditure world wide (IEA 2015: foreword), and firmly onto 
economic growth and employment opportunities. New efficiency markets, which include the 
manufacture of efficiency products and the supply chains that support buildings 
refurbishment, are now well established in Germany. For example, German companies have 
large market shares in growing, worldwide efficiency markets, such as in condensing boiler 
technologies (BMWi 2014c: 24). Indeed, in 2013 Germany had export volumes in the region 
of €3 billion for capital goods which help to protect the environment (BMWi 2014a: 4).  
There have also been some considerable market changes within construction 
industries. One claim is that strict buildings standards, such as the EnEV, and KfW loan 
schemes have led to high demand for renovations, for example $17bn was invested in 
building energy efficiency markets in Germany in 2014 (IEA 2015: 75). This in turn means 
that, combined with skills training, a large percentage of the labour force employed in skilled 
crafts, or in the planning and consulting sector, are now involved in energy-efficient 
renovations (BMWi 2014a: 30). Although much has already been made of new employment 
opportunities in renewable energy markets (Lauber & Jacobsson 2016: 148), employment in 
energy efficiency markets is now also in the many hundreds of thousands (IEA 2015: 81; 
Interview 2). In addition, Germany has one of the strongest energy service company (ESCO) 
markets in the world, partly due to the fact that there have been positive regulatory responses 
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to concerns raised by ESCOs that had previously experienced regulatory barriers to market 
entry (Bertoldi et al 2014: 79-81; Interview 3). 
These market and employment opportunities are notable in that they have been an 
important part of how various corporate and social groups have been experiencing energy 
system change. There are some other market outcomes of energy efficiency policy that have 
had an influence on how people have experienced change. As discussed in more detail below, 
energy prices have been rising but it claimed that energy efficiency policies have gone some 
way to offset the overall impacts on consumers. For example, although prices per unit are 
high, overall energy costs per household are not, whilst welfare policies also help to shelter 
the most vulnerable (Thalman 2015; SDSN 2015). Indeed research shows that German homes 
are better insulated than those in many other countries (Praetorius et al 2009: 64), which 
means that an average German household in 2011 used less energy than households in the 
United States, Britain, France and Spain (Thalman 2015: 2). Efficiency has, therefore, made 
some contribution towards sheltering consumers from the worst effects of high prices thereby 
making the energy transition somewhat more palatable socially.  
 
3.1.1 Challenges, New Debates and Efficiency Strategies 
Despite these achievements a number of critical policy discourses have emerged, not least 
arguments that Germany will miss its 2020 primary energy demand reduction targets 
(Interviews 3, 4 and 17). Others focus more specifically on future electricity demand as there 
are estimates that it will rise, partly due to the electrification of transport implied in the 
‘Mobility Energiewende’ that was announced in 2016 (Richardson 2016). Another critique is 
that the potential for heat savings still remains huge, given that approximately 85% of the 
energy consumed in buildings is now attributed to heating and hot water generation (BMWi 
2014c: 23). Importantly, some commentators are also calling for primary energy demand 
reduction achievements, listed above, into question, or at least the degree to which these 
achievements can be attributable to policy. Some argue that improvements in industrial 
energy efficiency were not as good as superficial numbers suggest because of links between 
industry energy efficiency measurements and low capacity use during the 2008-10 economic 
crisis (Schlomann & Eichhammer 2013: 3). Others suggest that, temperature corrected, 
improvements in buildings efficiency are not so impressive given that temperatures have been 
rising (Rosenow 2013).  
 Taken together these debates and critiques have placed considerable pressure on 
policymakers. Indeed, by having ambitious demand reduction targets, German policymakers 
have left themselves directly open to challenge in the event that these are not met. There is 
something, no doubt, intentional here and interviewees noted that Energiewende targets 
directly drive changes to policy decision-making as missing them is not considered feasible 
for international reputational reasons (Steinbacher & Pahle 2015; Interviews 3, 5, 21 and 23). 
There are also domestic political considerations and here it is not insignificant that a wider 
range of commercial and other actor groups do now have an interest in seeing energy 
efficiency markets continue to flourish.  
 Certainly there has been direct governance response to criticism, including renewed 
assertions about energy efficiency innovations being a decisive factor in the success of the 
energy transition (BMWi 2014c: 2; BMWi 2014b: 4; BMWi 2016b), as well as new strategies 
and policies adopted with the specific aim of meeting Energiewende demand reduction 
targets. For example, in 2014 the new ‘National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency’ (NAPE) 
was enacted as part of the Climate Action Plan 2020 (SDSN 2015). Within NAPE there is an 
emphasis on near term incentives and establishing energy efficiency as a business sector that 
can thrive without the need for financial support (BMWi 2014b; Interview 3). NAPE marks 
some departure, however, from previous efficiency strategies in that it placed particular 
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emphasis on the new market-based tender system for medium-scale efficiency projects and on 
supplying information and advice (BMWi 2014b: 4). 
 Before long, however, NAPE was also facing criticism – namely that it was too 
focused on information campaigns, with not enough financial stimulus and too small a role 
for KfW grants and loans (SDSN 2015: 55), although funding available through energy 
efficiency programmes remains a relatively generous $2bn per annum (IEA 2015: 129). There 
are further claims that progress in terms of turning NAPE measures into reality has been slow, 
and it is clear that some projects have not been passed or have been delayed (Amelang 2015: 
2; Interview 5). Others claim that improvements in reality still lag behind high expectations, 
which in turn are fostered by strict targets (SDSN 2015: 56).  
 These debates have informed yet more discussion amongst policymakers and their 
advisors, most significantly the BMWi’s Green Paper on Energy Efficiency published in 
October 2016 (BMWi 2016e). In this discussion document the principle of ‘Efficiency First’, 
which prioritises investments in customer-side efficiency resources, is accepted as a strategic 
planning principle (ibid: 14-15). In this government document the argument that strategic 
planning should be focused onto the demand, rather than supply side, of energy markets is 
rigorously emphasised. There have also been recent policy changes, specifically in the form 
of the ‘Effizienzoffensive’, the second large-scale efficiency strategy in less than a year and a 
half. Details of the strategy are, at the time of writing, still unclear but sources say that there 
will be generous stimulus, specifically that €17bn will be invested from 2016 to 2020 as part 
of the strategy (BMWi 2016b). Four new programmes will be launched, including an 
initiative to promote new, cross cutting technologies that enhance the efficiency of energy 
output or its use. This marks large-scale, planned investment in energy efficient technologies 
over the next five years. The new strategy also includes a comprehensive public awareness 
campaign, ‘Deutschland Macht’s Effizient’, designed to contribute to a consciousness shift in 
German society toward energy demand efficiency but also to encourage the individualisation 
of responsibility (ibid). In this way the ‘Effizienzoffensive’ is consistent with green industrial 
policies, by directing more investment into supporting the manufacturing, use and export of 
efficiency technologies, but also with NAPE’s focus on advice and information.  
 
3.2 Distributed Energy: Governance, Citizen Energy and Local Markets 
Germany stands out as a country where policymakers historically intended that the energy 
system become decentralised and recent pronouncements re-enforce that claim. According to 
the BMWi a decentralised energy system can lead to: efficient use of electricity and heat 
production; significantly lower transmission losses; energy security; job security and the 
regional accumulation of value (BMWi 2014: 20). This section argues, however, that German 
governance focus and market changes to date have been on distributed generation such that 
localised production and consumption, that could deliver the kinds of advantages outlined in 
section 2 above, remain on the fringes in Germany today.  
 It has been widely claimed that the 2000 energy policy, the Erneuerbare Energien 
Gesetz (EEG), provided the foundation necessary to promote a broad uptake of renewable 
technologies (Pescia et al 2015; Lauber & Jacobsson 2016). This is partly because EEG 
policies, such as priority access for renewable generation to the grid and the guaranteed return 
over a fixed time frame, enabled very low risk market conditions (Mitchell et al 2006). These 
conditions have been an important factor in making the cost of capital for renewables in 
Germany the lowest in Europe (Noothout et al 2016), and making renewable generation more 
accessible to a broader range of actors (Burger & Weinmann 2014: 49). Other governance 
decisions have been influential over how generation markets have changed. For example 
decisions that the KfW bank group should continue to focus on sustainability and that loans 
should be discounted have, in practice, provided affordable and accessible financial support 
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for new, small and medium sized sustainable market players (Fuchs 2014: 46). These 
decisions were no accident but reflected ideas behind policy design, for example about the 
need to create a reliable mass market in order to allow manufacturers of renewables to 
achieve economies of scale and reduce costs (Mike Ahearn, Chairman of First Solar in 
Mendonça et al 2010: xiv).  
By 2012 citizens, classed as individual households, minority stakeholders and 
cooperatives, had taken advantage of low risk investment conditions in that they owned 47% 
of renewable generation capacity (Borchert 2015; Interview 21). It has arguably been 
important for how political debates about energy have developed that benefits of system 
change have accrued to these citizen groups. This is not just in terms of citizens making 
money from generating renewables, but also because of the policy, as in energy efficiency, of 
creating new markets and jobs (Interviews 3, 4, and 5). Growing economic opportunities and 
employment in renewable generation markets has, indeed, resulted in more organised 
renewable industry associations. These and other interest groups together form a considerable 
renewable lobby in Germany, which some claim has contributed to too much governance 
emphasis on generation over demand innovations (Interviews 1 and 3). However, recent 
analysis suggests that broadening out citizen involvement has also been positive as more 
widespread exposure to energy leads to greater desire to become involved and to increased 
acceptance of localised renewable generation (Jacobs et al 2014; Borchert 2015; Kalkbrenner 
& Roosen 2016). It should, however, be pointed out that there are also political issues here 
around the uneven distribution of benefits. Notably, although the benefits of Germany’s 
energy system transition have been quite widely distributed, middle classes and farmers are 
over-represented in citizen ownership of renewables (Bardt & Niehues 2012: 250). 
 As such governance here, and the thinking behind it, has been more about distributed 
generation, the diffusion of generation technologies, and citizen buy-in to the Energiewende, 
and relatively less about creating fully distributed energy systems per se. Arguments are 
emerging about the need to localise energy markets as one route towards more use of energy 
close to where it is produced, as well as towards more community economic development 
(Klagge & Brocke 2012). These remain, however, more marginal to policy debates. Indeed, at 
the Federal level, in contrast to energy efficiency governance, there is no outright strategy or 
target in place. Policy emphasis has largely been on support for RD&D projects that, for 
example, work to establish energy ‘internets’ that can intelligently control and regulate local 
electricity systems (BMWi 2016b). Some RD&D funds were invested in 6 ‘E-Energy’ 
projects, including the Model City Mannheim (MoMa) project where the new IT system 
integrated electricity from renewables and CHP into local grids and market. Many policies 
aimed at localising energy, however, tend to be at the Land governance level where some 
municipals have been taking back contracts to run generation and distribution assets (Hall et 
al 2016; Interview 3). And there is some expectation that growing re-municipalisation may 
provide useful building blocks for altering the scale at which markets operate (Hockenos 
2013).  
 There is one Federal level policy, however, that has had some indirectly positive 
implications in enabling local energy. The Direct Marketing law, made compulsory as part of 
EEG 2.0, frees up generators of renewables from selling through the central EEG system, 
thereby allowing them to sell electricity directly to suppliers and/or on exchange (Julian 2014: 
15; Interview 19). A number of the innovative suppliers are now entering this newly opened 
up market, including Grundgrün, with its new ‘regional business model’, as well Lichtblick, 
with its SchwarmEnergie virtual power plant concept. One interviewee noted that the BMWi 
was preparing, in July 2016, to enable guarantees of origin (GOs) for EEG power plants on a 
regional basis, which would enable those interested to create regional offerings based on the 
GOs (Interview 25). 
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3.2.1 Challenges and Debates: Distribution, Cost Efficiency and Recentralisation? 
Although Germany has its fair share of innovative companies offering new distributed energy 
services, there are many, including a number of experts interviewed, who claim that there are 
Federal governance obstacles here (Interviews 2, 3, 5, 6, 19, 21, 25 and 26). For example, the 
BMWi’s report on the 6 E-Energy projects observed that although technologies have 
advanced market rules, especially around prequalification for balancing markets, need to be 
changed to better enable the emergence of local markets (BMWi 2014d: 28). As a result there 
are calls for a comprehensive market framework to govern local balancing markets, as well as 
growing interest in locational marginal pricing and balancing (Julian 2014: 15).  
 Another critical issue emerging in policy debates is the distribution grid, or more 
specifically distribution network operators (DNOs) and how they are regulated. This is a 
highly fragmented market in Germany and some DNOs have worked harder to, for example, 
integrate renewables than others. There are many that consider them, as an overall market 
segment, to have done as much to hinder distributed energy than to enable it (Interviews 19, 
25 and 26). This, it is claimed, is a governance problem in that DNOs have not yet been 
sufficiently motivated through regulation, nor have many had sufficient expertise, to change 
and become ‘smarter’ or, indeed, more transparent (Clausen & Jahn 2015: 37).  
 There is considerable awareness of these debates within policymaking circles. The 
Federal network regulator, Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), has already identified an 
‘intelligence gap’ in networks but considers that closing this gap will be a major challenge for 
DNOs (BNetzA 2011: 2). In November 2015 the Federal Cabinet adopted draft smart grid 
legislation, the Digitalisierungs Gesetz, which sets out plans on how to develop smart grids 
and a programme for adopting smart meters from 2017 onwards (BMWi 2015a). The draft 
Act also includes technical preconditions and data protection rules for the electricity sector to 
become digitised. There have also, however, been very long standing discussions over 
important new regulations to incentivise DNOs to emphasise smart grid improvements over 
capacity growth which, at the time of writing, had still not yet been concluded (BMWi 2015b: 
15; Interviews 24 and 26). 
 As suggested above, some arguments have been put forward that there are governance 
obstacles to the emergence of local markets, but energy policy debates about rising energy 
costs have also had implications for distributed generation (Lauber & Jacobsson 2016: 148). 
Surveys show that German electricity prices have been consistently amongst the highest in 
Europe (Schüppe 2014), not least because the costs of EEG surcharges has risen most years 
since its inception due to high uptake (Pescia & Graichen 2015: 6). Indeed, annual EEG 
surcharge costs, at €23bn in 2014, are expected to continue to rise until 2023, whilst network 
costs are also on the rise (Pescia et al 2015: 6). The argument, see section 3.1 above, that the 
impact of these costs has been somewhat offset by energy efficiency measures does not 
always have the same degree of political traction. 
What is also significant is that policy and system costs are not evenly distributed 
amongst consumers, in fact recent research points to a regressive and socially unbalanced 
distribution of costs amongst consumer groups (Bardt & Niehues 2012: 250). Surcharges, 
system costs and taxes now make up 70% of some customers’ bills, such that sharp falls in 
electricity wholesale prices have made little difference to some household and small and 
medium sized enterprise (SMEs) consumers. The situation for these particular groups has 
been exacerbated by the policy of exempting ‘self-consumers’ and heavy energy users from 
various payments. At the same time, the number of exempted consumers has been growing 
steadily such that, by 2014, 10% of all customers were exempt from, or paid heavily reduced, 
surcharges, taxes and grid fees (Appunn 2014a; Interviews 3, 14 and 20). These exemptions, 
in turn, represent costs shifted to SME, household and non-exempted commercial users. 
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Indeed, in the first half of 2014, a heavy industrial user with maximum exemptions paid 4.14-
4.64 cts€/kWh, whilst an average SME paid 15.56 cts€/kWh (Thalman 2015). These 
inequalities are exacerbated by the fact that renewable electricity is being sold in increasing 
amounts, at wholesale prices, across borders whilst the system and surcharge costs are picked 
up by German consumer groups (Interview 18; Morris 2016b). 
Many businesses not exempt from surcharges, some of which are represented by the 
powerful Bundesverbandt der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), have entered strongly into energy 
cost debates (Interview 20). The European Commission opened an in-depth enquiry into 
compliance with EU state aid rules that centred on EEG exemptions, which has added extra 
pressure on the government to address subsidy cost issues (Lang & Lang 2015). In addition, 
cost distribution and energy price issues have found a degree of public purchase and this is 
important because of fears that if this aspect of the Energiewende is seen as being overtly 
unfair then the whole transition might be called into question (Bardt & Niehues 2012: 250). It 
is important here, however, to differentiate between consumer groups, even within consumer 
categories such as households. For example, some consumers are prepared to pay higher per 
unit prices in order to remain customers of municipal suppliers on the basis that profits are 
reinvested in local services (Interviews 19 and 21). 
 The political and policy debates about cost inequalities are, however, important within 
the context of recent surveys. These show that although 90% of those surveyed support 
Energiewende targets, only 45% think that the Energiewende is properly managed (Pescia et 
al 2015: 10). Targets themselves, therefore, seem not to be open to question within current 
debates but the means of achieving them increasingly are. It is also not insignificant that cost 
focused debates coincided with the return to power, in 2009, of a Conservative-Liberal 
coalition more ideologically predisposed to focusing on short-term economic costs and less 
likely to take into account arguments about external costs of electricity generation and use 
(Lauber & Jacobsson 2016: 148). 
 In 2014 it came as little surprise, therefore, when the Federal government responded to 
cost, and other, concerns by making significant changes to the EEG, referred to as EEG 2.0. 
EEG 2.0 stipulates that energy intensive industry and new self-consumers, over a certain size, 
must start to pay a proportion of grid fees, surcharges and taxes (Interviews 2, 3, 5, 6 and 19), 
albeit exemptions for heavy users remain significant. New rules also seek to slow down 
and/or regulate the rate of growth of renewables, in particular PV and onshore wind, by 
setting annual capacity corridors (Pescia et al 2015: 14). Most significantly the EEG 3.0, 
which was announced in June 2016, set out new auction rules that will, as of January 2017, 
apply to medium and large-scale renewable generation (Morris 2016b; Appunn 2016).iii New 
PV generation below 750 kW in capacity will remain in the EEG system. At auction, bidders 
will have to put up a security deposit in order to show that their bid is serious. For onshore 
wind generators there will be another prerequisite: bidders will have to get their projects 
approved under the Federal Immission Control Act which is expected to be a costly process 
(Appun 2016).  
 One expectation is that the shift to auctions will reward incumbents and other large-
scale corporations over those that are less professionalised, such as community energy groups 
(Jacobs et al 2014: 10; Lauber & Jacobsson 2016: 154; Interview 19). Overall EEG 2.0 and 
3.0 changes are expected to reduce the security of investment for citizen groups thereby 
exposing them to greater revenue uncertainty, with potential implications for the cost of 
capital (Tisdale et al 2014; 2; Borchert 2015: 1). With regard to onshore wind, in particular, 
there is also a concern that planning permission will become more of an issue (Interview 19). 
Since these reforms there have been some shifts in PV markets. In 2014 total PV additions, at 
1.9GW, came in below the bottom of the capacity corridor, partly because small scale PV, in 
particular, has been impacted by the partial removal of self-consumption exemptions (ibid). 
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Perhaps more significantly, another study has found that, when measured in terawatt hours, 
citizen ownership of renewable generation had fallen to only 25% in 2015 from 47% in 2012 
(Morris 2016a).  
 There have been other governance and market changes that have potentially negative 
implications for the distributed nature of Germany’s energy transition. One has to do with the 
growing focus on offshore wind generation, which some argue can be seen as an attempt to 
get the ‘Big 4’ utility companies more involved in the Energiewende (Interviews 3, 4, 5 and 
10). Whatever the motivations, the new EEG rules are more favourable towards large-scale 
offshore wind and the rate of growth here has been considerable. As citizen ownership of 
renewable TWh’s falls so has ownership by the energy industry gone up, to 40%, mainly as a 
result of the boom in offshore wind (Morris 2016a). New capacity targets for offshore wind, 
at 15 GW by 2030, are also seen as generous whilst the upper limit of the corridor for onshore 
wind, the lowest cost renewable choice, has been reduced to 2.8 GW per annum (ibid). Higher 
proportions of offshore wind also have higher system cost implications in terms of system 
reliability, ‘re-dispatch’ costs, and because of the need to build out large-scale transmission to 
bring electricity onshore (Schlandt 2014; Interview 26). There is also a, some say associated, 
upward trend in distribution losses due to the changing locations of generation in relation to 
centres of demand  - the opposite of what localising generation and consumption achieves 
(Interviews 3 and 19). 
 These policy changes, and their effects on markets, raise high-level questions about 
the nature of the Energiewende. Germany’s current Energy Minister has claimed that the 
“…future energy system will be highly decentralised… millions of generators will be linked 
to customers via smart systems” (Baake 2014), whilst markets have moved in the opposite 
direction over the past few years. One important addition to this debate might be to consider 
whether and/or how value can be placed on having a distributed system (Interview 19). 
 
3.3 Demand Side Response (DSR): Governance and (Lack of) Market Change 
German electricity markets have been significantly altered by the growth of renewables – not 
least in terms of falling wholesale prices and increased intermittency. Until quite recently 
renewables had been quite well integrated into the German electricity system, partly because 
there had been overcapacity on the grid, but this is no longer the case placing greater 
emphasis on the need for flexibility of demand (Baake 2014; Interviews 4, 5, 17, 19 and 26). 
However, with a couple of notable exceptions (Jacobs et al 2014; Bayer 2015), DSR is the 
least well-analysed category of D3, perhaps reflecting the fact that governance in this area is 
comparatively less well developed. Indeed, what this sub-section tells us is that Germany 
lacks a joined-up strategy to enable greater load aggregation and response, whilst SME and 
consumer demand response remains largely untapped (BMWi 2014a: 24). Indeed, one 
estimate is that whilst in 2013 only about 2 to 3% of demand was flexible, over 50% of 
demand could in practice respond to supply (Agora 2013: 27).  
 In terms of storage Germany does have a reasonably well-developed track record of 
policy support (Interviews 14 and 17). Current policies focus on R&D into long-term, large-
scale storage systems and on funding programmes to assist in the uptake of battery systems 
with solar PV (BMWi 2016c). The market for home batteries has, indeed, been expanding 
quite rapidly, costs have been falling, and there are some innovative companies, such as 
Lichtblick and Tesla, operating in this space (Interview 14). There are, however, some fears 
that EEG 2.0 reductions in self-consumption exemptions will make the overall package for 
‘PV plus battery’ less attractive (Interview 19). With regard to large-scale storage the official 
Federal line at the moment is that it will not be needed in any widespread sense until 2035, or 
when renewables have reached 60% of gross electricity consumption (BMWi 2015e: 45; 
Deutsch & Graichen 2015: 1).  
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 Smart meters are also not seen as a central flexibility platform in the short-to medium 
term. Although policy here has been a long time coming, and there is still some lack of detail 
regarding smart meter rules, a decision has been made to roll out a differentiated but 
compulsory smart meter installation programme (Bayer 2015: 35). Smart meter policymaking 
is made more complicated by consumer protection regulation, especially regarding data 
handling, which makes smart meters more expensive to install and too expensive to mandate a 
roll-out to all consumers (Interviews 1, 19 and 26; BMWi 2015b: 71). This potentially 
excludes a wide proportion of the population from compulsory access to smart meters – with 
implications for aggregators of small to medium size loads. 
 Given market integration needs there has, as mentioned above, been some 
considerable policy refocus onto demand side response and flexibility. Although there is no 
comprehensive strategy in place for encouraging demand response, there have been some ad 
hoc market rule changes made, for example the introduction of quarter hour products on the 
intra-day market (since 2011) (BMWi 2014a: 21). This change, from the previous one-hour 
unit, was designed to boost competition, improve routes to market for, and integration of, 
renewables, as well as allowing balancing responsible parties to adhere more closely to their 
schedules (ibid: 21).  
 The main markets where demand response can participate, however, are the reserve 
markets run by the four German transmission system operators (TSOs) (Bayer 2015: 58). 
Most of those involved in demand response on these markets remain large industrial 
companies, conventional power plants, and pumped storage plants (Jacobs et al 2014: 31). 
Arguments have emerged, however, that reserve market pre-qualification rules are overly 
strict, implying high up front costs (Koliou 2014: 250), and that rules governing terms for pre-
qualification, size and availability are more suitable to flexible generation than demand 
(Bayer 2015: 58). Here too some regulatory changes have been made, which include lowering 
the minimum bid size and shortening tendering periods for primary and secondary balancing 
capacity (BMWi 2014a: 22). According to some analysts, though, rules remain too strict and 
this is continuing to put industrial demand response off participating (Agora 2013: 28; Koliou 
et al 2014: 250). 
 
3.3.2 New Challenges and Debates 
There are, however, more particular debates emerging with regard to the need to better 
involve small and medium size consumers in demand side response activities, in order to best 
optimise the system at lowest long-term cost (Agora 2013: 22). Here intermediary 
aggregators, and the market rules and incentives that effect their entry into and expansion 
within markets, are important. There are some very innovative companies already active in 
load aggregation and operating virtual (IT based) power plants in Germany, for example 
Grundgrün, Next Kraftwerke and Lichtblick (Koliou et al 2014; Schüppe 2014). Overall, 
however, aggregation of small and medium sized loads is seen to be just ‘at the door’ but not 
yet fully participating in markets (Interview 19). This is partly because here too business 
models, technology and IT developments appear to have outpaced governance innovations. 
As such these companies have been in conversation with policymakers, arguing that the 
regulatory landscape is too unclear and that it provides barriers to entry. In addition they 
argue that not enough value is placed on flexibility and aggregation in demand markets 
(Interviews 16 and 18), and no capacity market is planned. 
 One critical focus in these debates is on the absence of legal structures to define the 
rights and obligations of aggregators, or even a simple definition of an aggregator (BNetzA 
2015: 4; BMWi 2015b: 68). The concern is that without legal definition aggregators must 
depend upon the available, recognised market roles of ‘balancing group partner’ (BRP) and/or 
‘supplier’, and most end up registering as suppliers. This creates an unnecessary barrier to 
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market entry by placing demand aggregators in a position of either being in direct competition 
with incumbent suppliers or being required to negotiate balancing exposure remedies with 
them (BNetA 2015: 14; Hogan & Weston 2014: 25; Interview 25). Furthermore, within the 
context of current unbundling rules, each market participant has a separate role and 
aggregators must make separate arrangements with each of them. As such, aggregators 
require individual contracts with balancing group managers; electricity traders; TSOs and 
DNOs, whilst there are still no standard rules or clear contractual obligations (Jacobs et al 
2014: 35). In addition, important questions have also yet to be resolved regarding the legal 
role of consumers that provides demand response through an aggregator (Koliou et al 2014: 
251).  
 Calls have therefore emerged for the establishment of ‘aggregator’ as an independent 
market role with its own rights and obligations, with the Swiss and French models having 
been presented as example solutions (BNetzA 2015: 16). These models provide legal status 
for aggregators but they also replace the requirement for a bilateral agreement with a fixed, 
standardised procedure that indemnifies the supplier and/or BRP (BNetzA 2015: 16). There 
has also been some discussion about whether German aggregators should be able to act as a 
BRP for reserve markets only, without having to become a BRP for wholesale markets as 
well (Interview 19). Others have argued for a separating out of the roles of electricity supplier 
and BRP on the basis that demand aggregation is a separate service provided to customers at 
their discretion (Hogan & Weston 2014: 25).  
What is important to note here is that progress in terms of demand flexibility 
governance remains incremental, or in other words the German Federal government is not 
currently contemplating the kind of radical restructure of markets that, for example, is being 
planned in the New York Review of electricity markets (Mitchell 2015). There has indeed 
been some reluctance to produce new legislation. In response to aggregators’ concerns the 
BNetzA produced a position paper in 2015 which stated that, when it comes to the integration 
of new roles such as aggregator, competition must be protected and the interests of other 
market participants taken into consideration (BNetzA 2015: 16). The report concluded that 
‘special treatment’ for aggregators did not seem justified.  
Beyond the regulator’s response there is some recognition of the issues, in particular 
within the BMWi’s electricity market review process of 2014-15. The ‘Energy-only-Market 
2.0’ white paper makes reference to aggregators’ concerns but solutions continue to be ad hoc 
and there remains a lack of any comprehensive set of new market rules. The BMWi does 
commit to clarifying rules for the aggregation of flexible electricity consumers (BMWi 
2015b: 55), to evaluating the “rights and obligations of aggregators in the electricity markets”, 
and, to this end, to entering into dialogue with the relevant stakeholders along with the 
BNetzA (ibid: 68). As a first step, it is suggested that access for aggregators to the balancing 
energy markets is to be simplified and aggregators’ rights to access balancing groups will also 
be extended to minute and secondary balancing markets.  
 
4.		 Observations	and	Conclusions	
By taking an explicitly broad approach to defining demand innovations, and by focusing on 
what is happening in one country, this paper has managed to delve into some degree of detail 
about demand governance in practice. It is arguably by doing so across all D3 categories that 
the complexity of demand governance and dynamic interactions with changes in markets; 
political debates; and with other policy areas can be revealed. For example, the case of 
Germany suggests that ambitious, high profile demand objectives do more than just set 
direction for market actors, they can also act as a statement of intent that guides policymaking 
processes. German demand reduction governance also shows us that ambitious objectives 
both reflect domestic attitudes, whilst at the same time driving the high expectations that 
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underpin critique of government if it appears that they might be missed. However, what we 
also learn is that, in practice, even with a relatively high degree of political commitment the 
complexities involved in achieving demand reduction are considerable. This is partly because 
demand reduction policy has been contingent upon other governance areas, including 
buildings, industry and transport as decisions taken in each area have had implications for the 
others. 
 By extending the analysis to demand side response and distributed energy it has been 
possible to reveal yet more complexity but also some lack of governance innovation, and 
indeed regulations lagging behind market innovations. There is also some disconnect between 
not having a comprehensive strategy for distributed energy whilst, at the same time, claiming 
a ‘distributed energy future’. Indeed, recent energy governance and market changes appear to 
be re-orienting Germany’s energy system away from decentralisation, thereby also revealing 
the degree to which demand and renewable energy governance are inter-related. Analysis of 
demand side response governance reveals a similar lack of a comprehensive framework and 
the difficulties of placing a value on demand services in markets whilst applying only ad hoc 
changes to existing market structures. Taken together German demand governance has had 
multiple effects: enabled some demand innovations (efficiency markets), constrained others 
(demand side response), whilst at the same time influencing the near-term nature of the 
German transition process. 
 By analysing all three categories it has also been possible to reveal a lack of the kind 
of integration between demand policy areas that some transitions and energy policy analysts 
suggest is needed (IEA 2016). This is, perhaps, ironic given the observation above that 
Germany has, to some extent, already managed to integrate demand with policy areas outside 
energy. The BMWi’s 2015 white paper, however, does reveal some recognition of the need to 
better integrate demand governance in the claim that policymakers are considering greater 
coordination between incentives for efficiency and flexibility, as well as between efficiency 
and power market design (BMWi 2015: 88). This, however, falls short of the quite 
comprehensive overhauls of market rules currently planned and/or discussed in parts of the 
USA and Australia (Araújo & Bade 2016; ENA 2016; Mitchell 2016), whilst it appears that 
Swiss and French rules are more supportive of new aggregation business models and services. 
As such, although Germany has clearly achieved a great deal in energy efficiency terms 
demand governance, taken as a whole, is not yet particularly innovative. Those that emphasise 
the importance of involving citizens within energy markets (see ENA 2016), will be 
particularly disappointed by apparent moves away from citizen energy. 
 In conceptual terms, this analysis confirms that the ways in which citizens and 
corporate actor groups experience change is central to how policy debates are informed and to 
possibilities for governance change. Again, it has been important to be specific about actual 
challenges, debates and policy changes and to differentiate between actor groups. Some 
corporate actor groups, especially those frustrated by the lack of recognition for demand 
value, have been able to bring their learning and experiences to bear to help highlight failings 
in existing governance. At the same time, however, domestic debates about rising prices, and 
a government more sympathetic to near-term cost issues, led to the pull-back of support for 
distributed renewables. Governance, ultimately, has always needed to balance arguments 
about sustainable policy innovations with the interests of coalitions more interested in 
continuity but in Germany, on balance, this analysis shows that there has recently been a 
slight preference for market continuity. This tends to reinforce the notion that governance and 
politics, like transitions, are not static but dynamic making temporal considerations highly 
relevant (see Fouquet 2016). These observations tend also to reinforce arguments that 
governing for sustainable innovations needs to actively consider how to bring as much of 
society along with it as possible (Stefes 2010; Stirling 2014). 
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i ‘Phase	2’	is	used	here	in	the	sense	that	some	scholars	and	policy	analysts	understand	energy	transitions	as	
going	through	a	number	of	phases	(between	3	and	5	depending	on	the	analysis).	Not	many	countries	are	
considered	to	have	already	emerged	out	of	‘Phase	1’	yet,	but	Germany	is	one	of	those	countries	(Kitzing	&	
Mitchell	2015).	
ii	Interviews	are	listed	at	the	end	of	the	bibliography	according	to	numbers	–	i.e.	interview	1,	2,	3	and	so	on.	
Some	information	about	the	identity	of	each	interviewee	is	also	listed,	according	to	professional	function.	
iii	It	is	worth	noting	that	EEG	3.0	has	yet	(at	the	time	of	writing	in	August	2016)	to	be	approved	by	the	
Bundestag	and	the	Bundesrat	.	
